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Abstract
I develop a simple Hotelling model which relates the distribution of
consumer preferences to the intensity of competition. I impose two prop-
erties, mean preserving spread (MPS) and monotone likelihood ratio prop-
erty (MLRP), on distribution functions. These properties provide a way
to represent the intensity of competition in the Hotelling model. Market
competition is less intense as the distribution is dispersed in that the MPS
raises rmsequilibrium prices. This approach can describe how the inten-
sity of competition inuences the e¤ects of rms various strategies, which
has been largely neglected in most papers. Non-uniform distributions can
reverse some well-known results derived under the uniform distribution
dramatically. They also allow us to discover new results that the uniform
distribution could not demonstrate. As examples, I study three issues
such as incentives for innovation, preference based price discrimination,
and incentives for information sharing.
JEL Classication: D43, D82, L11, L13
Keywords: Hotelling model, intensity of competition, mean-preserving spread
(contraction), monotone likelihood ratio property, innovation, preference-based
price discrimination, information sharing
1. Introduction
The Hotelling model has been extensively used by economists for analyzing
various issues in oligopoly markets. A typical assumption in this model is that
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consumer preferences are uniformly distributed. There may be some reasons for
this simple assumption. One obvious reason is that it ensures simple closed-form
solutions. In addition, a general distribution may not provide further interesting
results in many papers.
However, the shape of the distribution of consumer preferences is important
in dening market competition. Let us consider two extreme cases. If consumers
are indi¤erent between two products, we have a degenerate distribution which
is localized at the middle point in the Hotelling model. In this case, products
are homogenous and the market is perfectly competitive. Conversely, if con-
sumers have a signicantly strong preference to one good over the other, we can
have a two-point distribution in that consumers are located on two end points.
Then competition disappears and rms are able to set monopoly prices for their
loyal consumers. Therefore, one can hypothesize that any intermediate level of
distribution of consumer preferences may represent an intermediate degree of
competition between monopoly and perfect competition.
The basic claim of this paper is that the distribution of consumer prefer-
ences corresponds to the intensity of market competition. In order to show
this, I analyze how a mean-preserving spread (MPS) of distributions changes
equilibrium prices. A mean-preserving spread implies that a greater propor-
tion of consumers has a higher relative preference for one good over the other.
I nd that the MPS raises rmsequilibrium prices even when two rms are
asymmetric. Market competition is less intense as the distribution is dispersed.
Hence the mean-preserving transformation stands for a change in the intensity
of competition in the Hotelling model. This is a new perspective, and a new
generalization, on the distribution in the Hotelling model.
One may argue that transportation costs or the size of product di¤erentia-
tion plays the same role for indexing the degree of competition in the Hotelling
model.1 However there is a huge di¤erence between two approaches. A more ef-
cient rms relative advantage over its rival is changed by the mean-preserving
transformation, while it is not by transportation costs.2 Namely, my approach
can demonstrate how the intensity of competition a¤ects competing rmsrel-
ative position in the market competition. This feature is very important to
analyze the e¤ects of rmsvarious strategies. When a rm plays a particular
strategy to achieve the relative advantage over its rival, the e¤ect of the rms
strategy depends on the intensity of market competition. However, this aspect
has been surprisingly neglected in most papers.3
As applications and examples, I will show how non-uniform distributions can
1When transportation costs are zero, the model exhibits perfect competition between ho-
mogeneous goods. On the contrary, when it is signicantly high, two rms become local
monopolists.
2We will see that the reason is that the equilibrium competitive front is changed by the
mean-preserving transformation of consumersdistribution. But it is invariant to transporta-
tion costs.
3 In fact, we may be able to generalize the function of transportation costs, and show
the similar analysis. At least technically, this way can be equivalent to considering non-
uniform distributions of consumer preferences. But this approach is less intuitive in economic
meanings.
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reverse some well-known results derived from the uniform distribution. Some
acclaimed results in the literature will be changed dramatically by considering
the intensity of market competition. Moreover, non-uniform distributions allow
us to discover new results that the uniform distribution could not obtain.
First, I study how the intensity of competition inuences incentives to inno-
vate. I nd that rms have more incentives for R&D as a market becomes more
competitive. In other words, more aggressive competition in product market in-
duces more R&D competition. The reason is that the size of relative advantage
obtained by innovation is greater as competition increases. But rmsR&D
incentives do not depend on the size of transportation costs in this model.
Second, I examine preference-based price discrimination under non-uniform
distributions of consumer preferences. The prevailing literature on this issue
shares one important result that price discrimination based on consumer pref-
erences is not a protable strategy. However, a noteworthy result here is that
rms can have higher prots from price discrimination in an intensely com-
petitive market such as an inverse U-shaped distribution. In this case, price
discrimination based on consumer preferences softens market competition by
letting rms compete on less competitive fronts.
Last, I investigate how the intensity of competition a¤ects incentives for
information sharing. Most papers in the literature are based on the model with
a linear demand, whereby equilibrium prot functions are always convex. In this
setting, for example, Gal-Or (1986) shows that rms prefer concealing private
information about costs in Bertrand competition, while information sharing in
Cournot competition. However, once again, I obtain the opposite result. When
market competition is su¢ ciently mild such as a U-shaped distribution, the
equilibrium prot function can be concave, and so information transmission
would be preferred in price competition.
There are a few papers which take into account non-uniform distributions or
analyze the transformation of consumersdistribution in the Hotelling model.
Under non-uniform distributions of consumer preferences, Shilony (1981) and
Neven (1986) examine rmschoices of their location, and Bester (1992) shows
the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in price competition.4 But
these papers do not study the e¤ects of transformation of consumersdistribu-
tion. Bloch and Manceau (1999) analyzes the e¤ect of persuasive advertising in
the Hotelling model. In their paper, only one rm advertises, and so the distri-
bution shifts towards the advertised product in the way of rst-order stochastic
dominance (FOSD). But the paper is based on a restricted class of distributions,
and the e¤ect of FOSD transformation on equilibrium prices is ambiguous. The
paper does not display the systematic variation in equilibrium prices.
In a di¤erent vein, Johnson and Myatt show that the dispersion of consumers
valuations leads to rotations of a demand curve. A remarkable result is that
a monopolist prefers low dispersion when serving a mass market, while high
dispersion when pursuing a small niche market. I believe that this paper is
4Shilony (1981) and Neven (1986) show the similar result that rms may tend to locate
inside the market as the distribution becomes more concentrated.
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complementary to their paper in understanding the role of consumer preferences
more fully. They nd that the dispersion of consumers absolute valuations
induces demand rotations, and study some implications in the monopolists
strategies. In contrast, my paper nds that the dispersion of consumersrelative
preferences between competing rms results in softening market competition,
and studies how the intensity of competition inuences the e¤ects of rms
strategies.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, I formally dene
MPS and MLRP in the Hotelling model and characterize the equilibrium. In
Section 3, I introduce three examples to show the importance of considering
non-uniform distributions of consumer preferences. Finally, concluding remarks
follow in Section 4.
2. Basic Model
Consider a simple market with two competing rms. Each rm produces
goods A and B with a constant marginal cost of cA and cB per unit respectively.
Each consumer is indexed by  2 [; ], where  =   < 0.  represents
a consumers relative preference for the product B over A. Consumers are
distributed by cumulative distribution function F over . The density function
f is symmetric at zero. To ensure nice demand curves, I assume that a hazard
rate f()1 F () is strictly increasing in . By this assumption, the second order
condition is automatically satised by the rst order condition.5
Assumption 1. Monotone hazard rate (MHR)
d
d

1  F ()
f()

 0 and d
d

F ()
f()

 0:
The symmetry of f ensures the second inequality. Now I consider a se-
quence of distribution functions, (F0; F1;   ; Fk;   ). They are ordered by
mean-preserving spreads as follows.
Assumption 2. Mean-preserving Spread (MPS). For  2 [; ] and
Z 

fk()d =Z 

fk+1()d,
Z

Fk(x)dx 
Z

Fk+1(x)dx
5Assumption 1 ensures upward reaction functions as well, i.e., @
2i
@pj@pi
 0. That is to say,
two goods are strategic complements.
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Assumption 2 means that a high order distribution is a mean-preserving
spread of a low order distribution. The economic interpretation of a mean-
preserving spread (contraction) is that the density of consumers with strong
preference to one good over the other increases (decreases) in k. To put it
di¤erently, the proportion of loyal consumers grows. Figure 1 represents some
possible density functions and corresponding distributions.
qq 00 qq
)(qkF
)(1 q+kF
)(qkf
)(1 q+kf
)(2 q+kf
)(2 q+kF
[Figure 1]
Since the mean is preserved, all possible distribution functions cross at  = 0.
They can cross more than once. But I consider the case in which MPS moves
density from the center toward the both tails smoothly, as presented in Figure 1.
Formally, to establish the smooth change of MPS, I further assume a monotone
likelihood ratio property on the sequence of distributions as follows.
Assumption 3. Monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP)
fk+1(0)
fk(0)
 fk+1(1)
fk(1)
for 0  1 2 [0; ] and
fk+1(0)
fk(0)
 fk+1(1)
fk(1)
for 0  1 2 [; 0]:
Then MPS results in the single crossing at 0 between distribution functions
for the interval  2 (; ). The literal meaning of this property is that the
likelihood of getting jj in Fk+1 relative to the likelihood of getting jj in Fk
increases in jj. When a MPS occurs, we have a stochastically larger density of
consumer with higher relative preferences. We will see that this property ensures
monotonic changes in rmsreactions functions and equilibrium prices.6 The
following lemma will be often used in future analyses.
6MLRP is widely used in the literature of contract theory and auction theory. Its important
role is ensuring the optimal compensation scheme to be monotonically increasing and allowing
comparison between bidding prices across di¤erent bidders or expected revenues across various
types of auction.
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Lemma 1. MLRP implies
For  2 [; 0] For  2 [0; ]
1  2Fk()
fk()
 1  2Fk+1()
fk+1()
1  2Fk()
fk()
 1  2Fk+1()
fk+1()
(1)
Fk()
fk()
<
Fk+1()
fk+1()
1  Fk()
fk()
<
1  Fk+1()
fk+1()
(2)
Fk()  Fk+1() Fk()  Fk+1() (3)
Proofs are provided in the Appendix. The results are fairly well-known
stochastic orders. The inequalities in (2) are often called reverse hazard rate and
hazard rate dominance respectively. The inequalities in (3) show a rst-order
stochastic dominance (FOSD) relationship. The MLRP implies (reverse) hazard
rate dominance, which implies the FOSD. Note that a high order distribution
dominates a low order distribution in the sense of the FOSD for positive ,
whereas the opposite relationship holds for negative .
From now on, in order to reduce repetition in notations, I use F and f
without subscript as a representative of distribution and density function re-
spectively. In this simple model, consumers  < e = pB   pA choose to buy
good A, whereas consumers   e choose to buy good B.7 The prot function
of each rm is given by
A = (pA   cA)F (e) and B = (pB   cB)(1  F (e)).
Each rms reaction function is
pA(pB) = cA +
F (e)
f(e) and pB(pA) = cB + 1  F (e)f(e) :
The solution for two reaction functions must satisfy
 = +
1  2F ()
f()
; (4)
where  = cB   cA.  indicates the location of marginal consumers at the
equilibrium. With this, we can describe rmsequilibrium prices and prots.
7 I assume throughout that the value of the goods is su¢ ciently high so that each consumer
buys one unit of either of two goods.
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Proposition 1. Equilibrium prices and corresponding prots are
pA = cA +
F ()
f()
and pB = cB +
(1  F ())
f()
; and
A =
F ()2
f()
and B =
(1  F ())2
f()
:
Equilibrium prices are represented by the ratio of each rms market share
and the density of marginal consumers at the equilibrium. The symmetric
outcome for cA = cB = c is simplied by pi = c +
1
2f(0) and 

i =
1
4f(0) . This
representation of equilibrium prices and prots shows noteworthy information.
They depend crucially on the density of marginal consumers at the equilibrium.
Note that an increase in the proportion of marginal consumers brings more
aggressive competition. The intuition to understand this result is simple. When
a rm charges a slightly lower price than its rival, it can attract more consumers.
Thus rms incentives to reduce prices are greater as the density of marginal
consumers is greater.
However, if we use the uniform distribution, f() = 1
2
, the symmetric equi-
librium prices are pA = c +  and pB = c + . These prices do not exhibit the
degree of market competition caused by the shape of distribution. Moreover,
rmsprice mark-up is always , which is the maximum size of relative prefer-
ence. But rms can charge higher or lower mark-up than  depending on the
density of marginal consumers if the distribution of consumer preferences is not
uniform.
q0
)(
)(21
1
1
q
q
+
+-
k
k
f
F
D-q
)(
)(21
q
q
k
k
f
F-
*
kq
*
1+kq
[Figure 2]
Without loss of generality, I assume that rm A is more e¢ cient than rm
B by  > 0. Then Figure 2 shows that the location of marginal consumers 
is greater than 0. This implies that the more e¢ cient rm sets a lower price.8
8However, its mark-up is higher, i.e., F (
)
f() >
1 F ()
f() .
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Moreover  is increasing in . As the cost di¤erence between two rms is
larger, the location of marginal consumers will be closer to . Then we can
easily show how each rms mark-up changes with . As  increases, rm As
mark-up rises, while rm Bs mark-up decreases.
@
@

F ()
f()

> 0 and
@
@

1  F ()
f()

< 0:
Now, a more interesting question is how the equilibrium changes with a
mean-preserving transformation of the distribution of consumer preferences. For
the symmetric rms, that is cA = cB = c, it is easy to show that the equilibrium
prices increase by the MPS from Fk() to Fk+1(). Let 

k represent the location
of marginal consumers at the equilibrium when rms face the consumer distri-
bution Fk(). By symmetry, 

k = 

k+1 = 0. Firmscorresponding equilibrium
prices are c+ 1fk(0) and c+
1
fk+1(0)
. Because fk+1(0)  fk(0), equilibrium prices
are greater in more dispersed distributions.
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This result is robust for asymmetric rms. The analysis for asymmetric
rms is rather complicated, but more intuitive. Both rms reaction curves
shift outward under the MLRP as represented in Figure 3. Thus, equilibrium
prices of both rms are always greater in higher order distributions. A rigorous
proof is presented in the Appendix. This result corroborates my basic claim
that the distribution of consumer preferences corresponds to the intensity of
competition. More dispersed (concentrated) distributions lead to less (more)
intense market competition.9
9Perlo¤ and Salop (1985) and Bester (1992) show that the dispersion of consumersdistrib-
ution increases rmsequilibrium prices. However, in their models, the dispersion is enforced
by scaling up consumers distribution; they multiply each consumers location  by some
factor. This is equivalent to increasing transportation costs.
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Proposition 2. Mean-preserving spread raises both rmsequilibrium prices.
cA +
Fk+1(

k+1)
fk+1(

k+1)
> cA +
Fk(

k)
fk(

k)
and
cB +
1  Fk+1(k+1)
fk+1(

k+1)
> cB +
1  Fk(k)
fk(

k)
:
One may argue that our result could be captured by transportation costs
or the size of product di¤erentiation in the Hotelling model even if consumer
preferences are uniformly distributed. In fact, in this model,  plays an identi-
cal role as transportation costs.10 Under the uniform distribution, equilibrium
prices are pA =  +
(2cA+cB)
3 and pB =  +
(2cB+cA)
3 , thereby increasing in .
However, there is an important di¤erence between two approaches in an-
alyzing market competition. The degree of competition is unvarying over the
entire locations under the uniform distribution. Thus the equilibrium location of
marginal consumers is invariable with . On the contrary, the mean-preserving
transformations change the equilibrium location of marginal consumers. This
seemingly small di¤erence yields signicant implications about rms relative
(dis)advantage.
A MPS shifts the location of marginal consumers  to the right; k increases
as k increases, i.e., k < 

k+1. The equilibrium condition (4) and inequality (1)
lead to this result as we see in Figure 2. This implies that the di¤erence between
two rmsequilibrium prices is getting smaller. In other words, rm As relative
advantage over rm B decreases as market becomes less competitive.
k+1   k =

1  2Fk+1(k+1)
fk+1(

k+1)

 

1  2Fk(k)
fk(

k)

> 0
()

Fk(

k)
fk(

k)
  1  Fk(

k)
fk(

k)

>

Fk+1(

k+1)
fk+1(

k+1)
  1  Fk+1(

k+1)
fk+1(

k+1)

The driving force behind this result is again the assumption of MLRP. The
marginal change in equilibrium prices by the MPS is greater for rm B than
rm A. The intuition is as follows. Firm A has more incentives to cut its price
relative to rm B when it faces Fk+1() rather than Fk() because it can attract
a stochastically larger proportion of consumers.
10 In a typical Hotelling model, the size of product di¤erentiation is normalized as a unit,
and transportation costs are measured by a parameter. On the other hand, our model can
be thought of as normalizing transportation costs as a unit, but denotes the size of product
di¤erentiation by . Anyway, both ways are equivalent.
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Proposition 3. As the distribution is transformed by the MPS (As k increases),
(1) k < 

k+1. The location of marginal consumers is closer to the right side.
(2) [pA(

k)  pB(k)] >

pA(

k+1)  pB(k+1)

. The di¤erence between two
rmsequilibrium prices is getting smaller.
This striking result shows that a rms relative advantage over the rival
depends on the intensity of competition. This implies that the intensity of com-
petition inuences the extent of e¤ects of rmsbusiness strategies. It is quite
obvious that when rms develop strategies to have competitive advantages over
onesrival, they assess how the current competition acts upon the consequence
of a strategy. However, this aspect has been largely left behind in most papers.
In the next section, I provide some applications to show that the consequence
of rmsbusiness strategies depends crucially on the intensity of competition
captured by non-uniform distributions of consumer preferences. Non-uniform
distributions may reveal new results that the uniform distribution could not
obtain. In addition, for some issues, we will see that some well-known results
obtained from the uniform distribution may collapse under non-uniform distri-
butions.
3. Applications
3.1 Incentives for Innovation
I extend the basic model by incorporating the possibility of R&D. In the
rst stage, two rms invest in innovation. In the second stage, price competition
follows. I assume symmetric costs for simplicity, thereby cA = cB = c. Firms
conduct process innovations which reduce marginal production costs from c to
c   . This R&D competition is a winner-take-all contest. Hence we need to
formulate the winners payo¤ and losers payo¤, which are denoted by W and
L respectively. Following the previous analysis, each payo¤ can be represented
as
W =
F ()2
f()
and L =
(1  F ())2
f()
;
where  = +
1  2F ()
f()
:
Let us consider the following simple R&D competition. IA and IB are
each rms investment levels respectively. Dene p(IA; IB) as the probability
that rm A wins, while 1   p(IA; IB) as the probability that it loses. Then
1   p(IA; IB) is rm Bs winning probability and p(IA; IB) is Bs correspond-
ing losing probability. To ensure an interior solution, I assume @p(IA;IB)@IA > 0,
@2p(IA;IB)
@I2A
< 0, @p(IA;IB)@IB < 0, and
@2p(IA;IB)
@I2B
> 0. Each rms expected prot is
10
A = p(IA; IB)
W + (1  p(IA; IB))L   IA and
B = (1  p(IA; IB))W + p(IA; IB)L   IB :
The rst-order conditions are @p(IA;IB)@IA (
W L) 1 = 0 and @p(IA;IB)@IB (W 
L)   1 = 0. Accordingly, given that the model is symmetric, we have IA =
IB = I
 satisfying W   L = 1p0(I;I) at the equilibrium. 11
This equilibrium condition implies that (W   L) can be thought of as
R&D incentives, because the equilibrium level of investment increases in (W  
L). Therefore we need to analyze how R&D incentives are changed by the
transformation of consumer distributions. Note that the di¤erence between the
winners and losers payo¤s can be simplied as
W   L = 2F (
)  1
f()
=   :
It can be easily shown that (W  L) is smaller as the order of distribution
rises, because we have    k >    k+1 by Proposition 3. That is to say,
the rmsR&D incentives are greater in the more competitive market.12 The
intuition to understand this result comes from Proposition 3. The winners
relative advantage over the loser is getting smaller as market competition is less
intense, because the winner has more incentives to cut its price relative to the
loser in the less competitive market.
Proposition 4. R&D incentives are greater as market competition becomes more
intense.
If we adopt the uniform distribution, we are not able to capture the ef-
fect of the intensity of competition on innovation incentives. Under the uni-
form distribution, the winners and losers payo¤s are W = 2( 
6
+ 12 )
2 and
L = 2( 
6
  12 )2 respectively. Each payo¤ depends on , the size of product
di¤erentiation. However, note W  L = 23. Interestingly, R&D incentives do
11Consequently, each rm has an equal chance of winning R&D at the symmetric equilib-
rium, i.e. p(IA; IB) =
1
2
.
12 In fact, there are some other ways to study the e¤ect of market competition on R&D
incentives. A typical way is considering the number of rms in a market. For example, Loury
(1979) and Lee and Wilde (1980) study how the equilibrium level of investment is changed by
the number of rms in a market. Several papers compare Bertrand competition to Cournot
competition because the Bertrand model yields more competitive market outcome than the
Cournot model does. For example, Delbono and Denicolo (1990), Bester and Petrakis (1993),
and Bonanno and Haworth (1998) compares incentives for innovation between Cournot and
Bertrand competition. In addition to these approaches, I examine this issue through the
intensity of competition in the Hotelling model which I have developed in the previous section.
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not rely on . Even if we include transportation costs in the Hotelling model,
they are incapable of showing the e¤ect of intensity of competition on innova-
tion incentives. In this sense, the shape of consumer distribution may be more
appropriate in some cases than transportation costs to demonstrate how the
intensity of competition a¤ects rmsstrategies.
3.2 preference-based Price Discrimination
Recently, preference or behavior-based price discrimination has been widely
studied. The Hotelling model has a good nature to analyze this issue because
this type of price discrimination is based on brand preference. A large body
of literature shares one important result that rmsprots are more likely to
decrease by price discrimination. Bester and Petrakis (1996), Chen (1997),
Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), and Armstrong (2006) are examples. However, I
will show that this result may not hold in a general distribution. In particular,
rms can increase their prots from the preference-based price discrimination
in intense competition, where consumer preferences follow an inverse U-shaped
distribution.
For simplicity, I assume that rms are symmetric, and marginal costs are
zero, cA = cB = 0. As a benchmark, I summarize symmetric equilibrium prices
and prots without price discrimination as below.
pi =
1
2f(0)
and i =
1
4f(0)
(5)
Now, suppose that a rm is able to observe whether a consumer has more
preference for its good or its rivals, i.e., whether  is greater or smaller than
0. Both rms o¤er di¤erent prices to di¤erent turfs. As in Bester and Petrakis
(1996), this scenario can be thought of as targeted coupons o¤ered to the rivals
turf. Also, this can be interpreted as the second-period poaching competition
as in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000).
Let pi denote the price o¤ered to a consumer in its own turf, while bpi repre-
sents the poaching price o¤ered to a consumer in its rivals turf. Price compe-
tition in rm Bs turf yields the following prot functions.
bA = bpA(F (e)  1
2
) and B = pB(1  F (e)). (6)
Equilibrium prices and prots are
12
bpA = F ()  12
f()
and pB =
1  F ()
f()
bA = (F ()  12 )2
f()
and B =
(1  F ())2
f()
;
where  =
3
2   2F ()
f()
: (7)
Similarly, we can nd equilibrium prices and prots in competition of rm
As turf, which are simply symmetric. If consumers are uniformly distributed,
we can easily nd that pi =
2
3 and bpi = 3 . Both prices are lower than the
non-discrimination symmetric equilibrium price . Thus, rms are worse-o¤ by
price discrimination denitely. To explain this result, Armstrong (2006) writes
"discrimination acts to intensify competition ... when rms di¤er in their view of
which markets are strong and which are weak." Similarly, Corts (1996) uses the
term "best response asymmetry" and Anderson and Leruth (1993) says "rms
compete on more fronts".
However, if f() is su¢ ciently small compared to f(0), discriminating prices
can be greater than non-discriminating price. Then we have a possibility that
equilibrium prots are greater with price discrimination. This result stands in
sharp contrast to the previous literature. Formally, the equilibrium prots with
price discrimination are given by
PDi =
2F ()2   3F () + 54
f()
: (8)
A su¢ cient condition for PDi > 

i is f(0) > 2f(
). This condition sug-
gests that the total number of marginal consumers do matter for the comparison
of equilibrium prots. Without price discrimination, it is f(0), whereas it is
2f() with price discrimination.13 Interestingly, an inverse U-shaped distribu-
tion can yield the situation in which the preference-based price discrimination
is a protable strategy.
 Example. Consider the following density function f() =   1

2 jj + 1 . The
corresponding distribution function is F () = 12 +
2
2
2 +
1

 for  < 0 and
F () = 12   
2
2
2 +
1

 for  > 0. Without price discrimination, the symmetric
equilibrium prices and prots are pi =

2 and 

i =

4 . With price discrimination,
13The necessary and su¢ cient condition is weaker, because the convexity of equilibrium
prot functions allows rms to have additional gains through price discrimination. I will
discuss this property in the next section.
13
equation (7) becomes  = 34 
q 
3
4
2   14 . It can be shown that the su¢ cient
condition f(0) > 2f() holds if  <
q
3
8 .
Proposition 5. If market competition is very intense, rmsequilibrium prots
can be greater with the preference-based price discrimination.
In general, as more consumers have strong preferences, rms may want to
price discriminate more. However, paradoxically, preference-based price discrim-
ination is a protable strategy when consumers have relatively weak preferences
to both rms. Competition for the whole market is very intense, but competi-
tion in the segmented markets is less intense. Following Anderson and Leruths
words, we can say "rms compete on less competitive fronts" through price
discrimination.
3.3 Incentive for Information Sharing
Here I investigate how the intensity of competition inuences incentives to
share private information. There are many papers which address this issue.
Vives (1990) and Gal-Or (1985, 1986) show that the incentives for information
sharing depend on the nature of competition (Cournot or Bertrand) and the
nature of the information structure (demand or costs). In particular, regarding
private information about costs, Gal-Or (1986) shows that information sharing
is a dominant strategy with Cournot competition and concealing is a dominant
strategy with Bertrand competition.
One critical point in the literature is that the analyses are based on a linear
demand curve. With a linear demand curve, equilibrium prot functions are
convex. This is a crucial driving force behind their results. However, the shape
of value functions changes with the intensity of competition, and it can be
concave. Thus I will show in the simplest form that their results can be reversed.
Let us consider the following textbook example. Suppose rm Bs marginal
cost is c, while rm As marginal cost is uncertain. It can be either cH or cL
with equal probability, where cL < cH . Information is asymmetric. Firm A
knows its own marginal cost and rm Bs. But rm B knows its cost and only
that rm As marginal cost is either cH or cL with equal probability.14 All other
things are common knowledge. I assume (cH   c) = (c  cL) so that rm A does
not have any ex ante cost advantage. I dene marginal consumers in each state
as eH = pB   pA(cH) and eL = pB   pA(cL).
Then rm As prot function in each state is written as A(cH) = (pA(cH) 
cH)F (eH) and A(cL) = (pA(cL)  cL)F (eL). Firm B anticipates that rm As
price will be pA(cH) or pA(cL). Firm B solves EB = 12 (pB   c)(1  F (eH)) +
1
2 (pB   c)(1  F (eL)). Then the Bayesian Nash equilibrium is characterized by
14One justication for this situation is that rm A may be a new entrant or it may employ
a new technology.
14
IH = c  cH +
1  2F (IH)
2f(IH)
and IL = c  cL +
1  2F (IL)
2f(IL)
; (9)
where IL =  IH > 0 by symmetry. Note that this implies f(IL) = f(IH) and
F (IL) = 1   F (IH). Equilibrium prices are pA(cH) = cH + F (

H)
f(H)
; pA(cL) =
cL+
F (L)
f(L)
; and pB = c+
(1 F (H))+(1 F (L))
f(H)+f(

L)
= c+ 12f(L)
: Now we are interested
in rm As ex ante expected prot. Those are given, respectively, by
EIA =
1
2
F (IH)
2
f(IH)
+
1
2
F (IL)
2
f(IL)
:
Now, let us consider the case that rm A shares the information about its
marginal cost. Then rm As ex ante expected prot is simply the average of
equilibrium prots in each state under complete information.
ESA =
1
2
F (SH)
2
f(SH)
+
1
2
F (SL)
2
f(SL)
,
where SH = (c  cH) +
1  2F (SH)
f(SH)
and SL = (c  cL) +
1  2F (SL)
f(SL)
:(10)
One can easily nd IH < 
S
H < 0 < 
S
L < 
I
L by comparing (9) with (10).
More generally, (IH ; 
I
L) can be thought of as an MPS of (
S
H ; 
S
L). This implies
that the shape of equilibrium prot function determines when rm A has higher
prot. If the distribution is uniform, EIA =

2 +
(cH cL)2
32
and ESA =

2 . Since
EIA > E
S
A, concealing information is a dominant strategy, which is consistent
with Gal-Or (1986).
However, the expected equilibrium prots can be concave in L. The rst
derivative gives us @E[
I
A]
@L
= (2F (L)  1)  [F (L)
2+(1 F (L))2]f 0(L)
2f(L)2
. Under the
uniform distribution, the second term disappears because f 0(L) = 0. Thus, im-
mediately, we can see that the expected equilibrium prot is a convex function.
If the distribution is not uniform, the second derivative is given as
@2E[IA]
@2L
= 4f(L) 

@E[IA]
@L

f 0(L)
f(L)

+ E[IA]
@
@L

f 0(L)
f(L)

:
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In a U-shaped distribution of consumer preferences, we have f
0(L)
f(L)
> 0, and
@
@L

f 0(L)
f(L)

can be positive. Hence there is a possibility of having a concave
prot function.15 If this is the case, information sharing is a dominant strategy.
 Example. Consider the following density function f() = 1

2 jj. The corre-
sponding distribution function is F () = 12   
2
2
2 for  < 0 and F () = 12 +
2
2
2
for  > 0. In this case, equation (9) becomes IH =
2
3 (c cH) and IL = 23 (c cL),
while equation (10) becomes SH =
1
2 (c cH) and SL = 12 (c cL). It can be easily
shown that EA = 12
F (H)
2
f(H)
+ 12
F (L)
2
f(L)
= 14

L

2 +

2
L

. Therefore, EIA R ESA
corresponds to 
2 Q 4
q
c cL
3 .
Proposition 6. The equilibrium prot function can be concave, and information
sharing can be a dominant strategy in price competition if market competition
is mild.
Information sharing allows rms to compete on farther within fronts in the
Hotelling model.16 Thus, through information transmission, rm A can induce
competition on less competitive fronts in a U-shaped distribution.
4. Concluding Remarks
I have set forth the simple Hotelling model which relates the distribution of
consumer preferences to the intensity of competition. The imposition of MPS
and MLRP on the distributions provides a way of analyzing the change of equi-
librium prices. The analyses in this article highlight the importance of taking
into account non-uniform distributions in the Hotelling model in the sense that
the e¤ects of rmsstrategies change with the intensity of competition. Through
three examples, I emphasized how non-uniform distributions of consumer pref-
erences can play a signicant role by reversing some well-known results or by
discovering new results. In this sense, the uniform distribution typically as-
sumed in the Hotelling model may be very restrictive.
There are many possible extensions of my paper. We may be able to study
rmsstrategies to change consumerspreferences. For example, advertising or
15 In most models, the shape of equilibrium prot functions is determined by whether
marginal competition increases or decreases by a given parameter, which is captured by
@
@L

f 0(L)
f(L)

in this model. If marginal competition increases, the equilibrium prot function
is displayed by a concave curve. My another working paper, Kim and Bang (2007), studies
this issue in the dynamic competition model.
16Under Cournot competition where reaction functions are downward sloping, information
sharing allows rms to compete on farther away fronts in the sense that the low cost type rm
produces more and the high cost type rm produces less. I believe that this is why Gal-Or
(1986) nds that information sharing is a dominant strategy with Cournot competition.
16
promotion may play a role of changing the distribution of consumers prefer-
ences as in Bloch and Manceau (1999). Although these are important issues in
marketing literatures, we do not have a formal economic model. Of all things,
I believe that the simple framework developed in this article will be very useful
for further researches on various topics.
I conclude the paper by presenting another interesting perspective on the
distribution of consumer preferences. In fact, in the Hotelling model, each con-
sumers valuations for the two products are perfectly negatively correlated. In
contrast, they are perfectly positively correlated in the Bertrand model. These
two familiar models can be thought of as limiting cases of a general model in
which each consumers valuations are independently distributed. Chen and Ri-
ordan (2006) shows this general model with a rectangular area. Nevertheless,
this is nothing but the shift of the distribution of consumer preferences in the
Hotelling model. At last, the Hotelling model with a general distribution of
consumer preferences is the most generalized model.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. For  2 [0; ], the denition of MLRP gives us
fk+1(0)fk(1)  fk+1(1)fk(0): (A1)
Integrate both sides over 0 from 0 to 1. We have
 
Fk+1(1)  12

fk(1) 
fk+1(1)
 
Fk(1)  12

: Rearrange, and this inequality can be rewritten by
1  2Fk()
fk()
 1  2Fk+1()
fk+1()
:
Similarly, integrate both sides in (A1) over 1 from 0 to , and it turns out that
fk+1(0) (1  Fk(0))  (1  Fk+1(0)) fk(0). This inequality is called hazard
rate dominance,
1  Fk()
fk()
<
1  Fk+1()
fk+1()
:
Let us dene the hazard rate of F by k()  fk()1 F () . If we write  k() =
d
d ln(1   F ()), then the distribution function can be written as Fk() = 1  
exp(  R 
0
k(x)dx). It is straightforward to show FOSD as follows.
Fk+1() = 1  exp( 
R
0
k+1(x)dx)  1  exp( 
R
0
k(x)dx) = Fk():
Likewise, we can easily show the opposite stochastic orders for  2 [; 0].
Proof of Proposition 2. For the distribution Fk(), rmsreaction functions are
given by
17
pA(pB) = cA +
Fk(pB   pA)
fk(pB   pA) and pB(pA) = cB +
1  Fk(pB   pA)
fk(pB   pA) :
First, lets analyze how the MPS a¤ects pA, given pB . Since the density function
is symmetric at 0, rm As reaction function can be written by
pA   cA = 1  Fk(pA   pB)
fk(pA   pB) :
The left-hand side pA cA is increasing in pA, while the right-hand side 1 Fk(pA pB)fk(pA pB)
is decreasing in pA. These are represented in Figure A1. Note that they must
intersect on the range where pA is greater than pB . By inequality (3) in Lemma
1, we have 1 Fk()fk() <
1 Fk+1()
fk+1()
. Therefore, pA is always greater in a higher
order distribution, given pB . This implies that rm As reaction function shifts
outward. Similarly, we can show pB is also greater in a higher order distribution,
given the level of pA.
AA cp -
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BAk
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-
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[Figure A1]
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